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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

24 May 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel Paul S. Reinecke, USA (G-2)
Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (ONI)
Colonel Willis B. Sawyer, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Colonel Floyd E. Dunn, USA (JIG)
Mr. Charles H. Reichardt (AEC)
Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz (FBI)

SUBJECT : SNIE 11-9-55: Clandestine Introduction of
Nuclear Weapons

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from the Chairman of the ICIS to the Chairman of the IAC requesting by about 21 June an estimate on the probabilities of clandestine introduction into the United States of nuclear weapons. A copy of this was made available to the members of the IAC at the meeting on 24 May, at which time the IAC approved going ahead with this estimate.

2. In view of the specialized subject matter and the relatively short time given for the preparation of the estimate, it is requested that your representative meet with us at 2:00 Friday, 27 May, to submit contributions--either existing papers bearing on this subject or oral contributions.

3. In particular the representatives of the AEC and the FBI are requested to brief the group on existing means of detection.

4. The meeting will be held in Room 143 Administration Building.

Paul A. Borel

PAUL A. BOREL
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

3527 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ICIS-P25/290

May 17, 1955

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Chairman
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

A joint committee of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, with a technical advisor from the Atomic Energy Commission and with ad hoc representatives from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, is studying the advisability of placing limitations on the diplomatic pouch, specifically the size and weight of separate packages, in order to lower its effectiveness as a possible means for clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

In connection with this study the ICIS would appreciate receiving the following information:

Based on estimated capabilities of the USSR in production of nuclear weapons and considering estimated USSR strategic policy, including advantages and disadvantages of this course of action to the Russians, what do our intelligence agencies consider as the probability that an attempt will be made by the USSR to effect the clandestine introduction into the U.S. of nuclear weapons or their nuclear components by means of entries and shipments covered by diplomatic immunity before an all out attack on this country by nuclear weapons delivered either by aircraft or missiles?

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In preparing the above estimates it is suggested that you take into account the fact that existing procedures and use of existing detection devices afford a low probability of detection, and none of identification, of nuclear weapons or their components which might be introduced through entries and shipments covered by diplomatic immunity. Should further details be desired in this connection, ICIS will be glad to arrange appropriate briefings.

There should be an estimate of current probabilities as well as an estimate of probabilities based upon anticipated changes in USSR capabilities over the next several years.

Comments on any varying opinions between agencies on this matter and the assumptions on which they are based are also desired.

It is requested that the above estimates be made available to the ICIS within one month.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. Walter Yeagley

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

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